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In 2016, a liar made a hypocrite appear worse and thereby won the US presidency. How did a liar, which 
is traditionally deemed something worse than a hypocrite, manage to do this? This article offers an 
answer. It does so by uncovering a peculiar mechanism, a Trumpian mechanism, at the heart of Trump’s 
relations with his critics. The mechanism explains how Trump benefited from wrong-footing his critics 
and is thus essential for understanding Trump’s success. The article offers a few key examples of this 
mechanism working against Trump’s political opponents, e.g., Trump’s (first) impeachment. It then 
shows how the mechanism also worked against Trump in regard to his handling of Covid-19. Ultimately, 
the mechanism helps explain both the outcome of the 2016 and the 2020 elections. The article concludes 
by stressing the importance of using this mechanism to better understand the Trump phenomenon. It 
claims that using the mechanism as a guide to understand Trump can prevent empowering the very 
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A Trumpian Mechanism 
 
The 2016 presidential election was an election between a liar and a hypocrite. The hypocrite lost because 
the liar succeeded in making the hypocrite appear worse. Customarily, liars are deemed worse than 
hypocrites. Liars are usually condemned because their statements are deliberate attempts to deceive. 
Hypocrites, on the other hand, need not always intend to deceive. For example, a preacher who espouses 
the importance of living according to particular values might occasionally fall short of those values by 
acting contrary to his stated beliefs. As such, hypocrites are deemed better than liars because they have 
a sensibility to moral argument that liars do not possess. Even hypocrites who do intend to deceive, 
whether through suppression of disreputable actions or a pretense of concern, are deemed better than 
liars for this very reason—because they have an acute sense of the importance of moral standards (even 
if they just pay lip service to them), which is something liars seem to lack. “Lying is a much broader 
category than hypocrisy,” Ruth Grant writes, “and they rarely require a pretense of belief in a particular 
principle or ethic” (30). At the very least, then, hypocrisy requires moral pretense, paying tribute to 
(and perhaps even strengthening) a shared set of ethical norms. 1  As William Raspberry writes, 
“Hypocrisy recognizes that the erosion of standards hurts everybody. It accepts the sanctity of societal 
standards, even while violating them. It says: What I’m doing is wrong; therefore I must not be found 
out.”2 Accordingly, when a hypocrite is caught acting contrary to their stated values, they either deny 
their deeds (e.g., Bill Clinton), publicly apologize (e.g., John Edwards), or rationalize their deeds by 
claiming the higher ideals toward which they aim occasionally necessitate undignified actions (e.g., 
Barack Obama). The latter sets itself apart from the others precisely because of its affirmation of 
hypocrisy. For example, Obama’s hypocrisy, labeled principled compromise, has been lauded as a 
positive (perhaps defining) feature of American democracy. Although he acted contrary to his stated 
values, his actions were strategic, committed in the service of “our” highest ideals—i.e., “you can’t 
compromise in terms of speaking, but in terms of what you do, there are pragmatic reasons and 
sometimes reasons of principle not to act on them” (MacFarquhar). This type of hypocrite is one whose 
willingness to be hypocritical is seen as their strongest characteristic. Hillary Clinton never appeared to 
be this type of hypocrite, yet she too could be understood as affirming the necessity of hypocrisy.  
Prior to 2016, Clinton’s hypocrisy was deemed critical for the power politics she embodied. She knew 
she was a hypocrite and knew why, and this was transparent to us as well. As David Runciman wrote in 
2008, “[Hillary] is both skeptical and somewhat cynical, and therefore is bound to wear a mask; she 
has constructed a persona for herself in order to negotiate the world of power politics as she understands 
it… If she is sincere about anything, she is sincere about power” (216). As such, she was perceived as 
especially adept at international relations, skillful at maintaining and promoting America’s central place 
within the political order—far better, at least, than a liar.3 As Tyler Cowen writes, “When it comes to 
how the agent speaks to allies and enemies, you almost always should prefer hypocrisy to bald-faced 
lies. The history and practice of diplomacy show this.” Although this form of hypocrisy is perhaps less 
appealing than principled compromise (which is one reason Obama defeated her in the 2008 primaries), 
you know what you are getting. Hillary might not do what she says, but she is at least limited in her 
hypocrisy by the respect she holds for “the abstract rules and principles that underlie the social order” 
(ibid). Accordingly, prior to 2016, Hillary could be trusted to affirm our basic principles while avoiding 
completely unacceptable words and actions: “she is less likely than more sincere politicians to be 
hypocritical about the things that really matter” (Runciman 216). In sum, hypocritical politicians, even 
those who simply have a thirst for power, understand the importance of (and perhaps even strengthen) 
the rules of the game; cold-blooded liars do not, which is a central reason hypocrites are deemed better 
than liars. How then did the hypocrite appear worse than the liar in 2016? 
One reason is that the liar did not really deceive many people with his lies, nor were his lies 
necessarily intended to deceive. Some mainstream media outlets briefly took note of this phenomenon 
(without thereafter internalizing it). For example, The Washington Post wrote, “Many Trump supporters 
don’t believe his wildest promises — and they don’t care…They view Trump’s pledges more as malleable 
symbols than concrete promises” (Johnson), and the New York Times noted, “Many don’t take his 
promises literally—for instance, only 42 percent of Republicans believe Trump will succeed in making 
 
1 As La Rochefoucauld famously wrote, “Hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue.” 
2 Ruth Grant would most likely agree, as she attributes the frequency of hypocrisy in politics to “the strength of the 
moral impulse in public life” (14).  
3 A primary reason Obama saw her as a natural fit for Secretary of State.  
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Mexico pay to build a wall” (Nyhan). Yet, most of the mainstream media continued to meticulously fact 
check and publicize, in an apparent attempt to generate outrage, Trump’s ever-accumulating lies. Noting 
the disconnect between the mainstream media and Trump’s supporters’ interpretation of his words, 
Salena Zito argued in The Atlantic, “the press takes him literally, but not seriously; his supporters take 
him seriously, but not literally.” Republican strategist, Brad Todd elaborated: 
 
Journalists are conditioned to believe that words are the ultimate product, to be curated, sweated, grinded 
and polished… But real estate developer Donald Trump’s training on words is entirely different—and the press 
has yet to adapt to it… [The public] sees Trump’s words differently than journalists do. They… see Trump not 
as a politician but as a businessman. They know, and even value, the fact that his words have not passed 
through a gauntlet of spinners, prose smoothers, and fact-checkers. They may have met other real estate 
professionals in their own lives and they know better than to take the words of ad hoc marketing seriously. 
These supporters are not giving Trump a benefit of the doubt. They recognize his professional DNA, and 
journalists are overdue to recognize this discernment by their own audiences. 
 
In other words, the mainstream media was largely blind to the fact that Trump’s lies were not truly 
deceptive. Many of his lies were, to use a phrase from the ghostwritten The Art of the Deal, “truthful-
hyperbole,” viz., intentional exaggerations meant to reveal a kernel of truth. For example, he made 
outlandish claims and promises, such as, “[Clinton] may be the most corrupt person ever to seek the 
presidency,” “we are going to build a wall and Mexico is going to pay for it,” unemployment is not 5.6 
but “maybe even 21 percent,” “[I’m] calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslim’s entering the 
United States,” etc., but most of them could be reduced to simple truths, e.g., Hillary suppresses her 
true intentions and past actions to protect herself and her political career, not us; we need to improve 
our immigration system, increase employment (especially US production jobs), and revamp our vetting 
protocol, etc. 4  Accordingly, Trump’s lies were not understood by his supporters as attempts to 
intentionally deceive, but ‘tell it like it is’ speech that made them feel as if they were in on the lies with 
him.5 
Another reason the hypocrite seemed worse than the liar was that the hypocrite appeared to deceive 
herself. Generally understood, self-deception involves a situation in which an individual is so motivated 
to believe a conception of who they are that they deny all evidence to the contrary. In such cases, what 
the individual is for themselves, i.e., how they perceive themselves, is in direct conflict with what they 
are for others, i.e., how they are perceived from an external point of view. Jean Paul Sartre’s notion of 
bad faith is instructive here, especially his example of a man who lives in denial of his homosexuality. 
He writes: 
 
A homosexual frequently has an intolerable feeling of guilt, and his whole existence is determined in relation 
to this feeling. One will readily foresee that he is in bad faith. In fact it frequently happens that this man, 
while recognizing his homosexual inclination, while avowing each and every particular misdeed which he has 
committed, refuses with all his strength to consider himself ‘a paederast.’ His case is always ‘different,’ 
peculiar; there enters into it something of a game, of chance, of bad luck; the mistakes are all in the past; 
they are explained by a certain conception of the beautiful which women cannot satisfy; we should see in 
them the results of a restless search, rather than the manifestations of a deeply rooted tendency, etc., etc., 
Here is assuredly a man in bad faith who borders on the comic since, acknowledging all the facts which are 
imputed to him, he refuses to draw from them the conclusion which they impose (Sartre 108). 
 
This person is in bad faith because he denies that his past actions, his facticity, have any bearing on 
his open future, i.e., his transcendence. He sees himself as able to create himself anew each moment—
just because he engaged in homosexual actions yesterday does not mean he is or will be gay tomorrow. 
While this man is no doubt correct that his past does not wholly determine what he is, he cannot escape 
it. His facticity is constitutive of his being. This is precisely why his entire existence is determined by a 
feeling of guilt—he attempts to hide from how he appears to himself from the outside, to flee the 
 
4 As Peter Thiel noted, “when [Trump supporters] hear things like the Muslim comment or the wall comment or 
things like that, the question is not ‘Are you going to build a wall like the Great Wall of China?’ or, you know, ‘How 
exactly are you going to enforce these tests?’ What they hear is ‘We’re going to have a saner, more sensible 
immigration policy.’ ‘We’re going to try to figure out how do we strike the right balance between costs and 
benefits’” (Yarow).  
5 For example, one Trump supporter noted in June 2016, “I think it’s symbolic. I mean, a physical wall? It’s just 
such a strong vision and idea, but I just care about the border being secure” (Johnson). Another claimed, “[A]s I 
got to listen a little closer and realize the gist of what he was saying. What would you say as a nonpolitician? You’d 
say, ‘Let’s bomb the bastards.’ Right? It’s not like he’s going to, but he says it to let people know he means 
business” (Todd and Zito 92).  
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inescapable gaze of the other. In other words, although he knows he has an open future he denies that 
he sees himself as already seen by another; he denies that the gaze of the other also determines his 
existence along with his transcendence. To be authentic, this person would have to own up to his past, 
come to terms with the fact that engaging in his previous actions is precisely what it means to be 
homosexual. That is, he must acknowledge that he is, and always will be, both what he is for himself 
and what he is for others. 
Hillary Clinton appeared to deceive herself in just this way. As noted above, Hillary had always been 
perceived as a hypocrite, but her hypocrisy was not necessarily deemed a disqualifying feature of her 
political persona. Often it was considered a positive feature—she had experience navigating the world 
of power politics, of playing the game and coming out on top, and would thus excel in a leadership role. 
However, in 2016, Hillary Clinton seemed to deceive herself regarding her own hypocrisy despite all 
evidence to the contrary. This apparent denial of who she had always been made her hypocrisy seem 
worse than it was before. Was she trying to fool us or was she lying to herself? Concluding her account 
of the “corrupted forms” of the two ideal forms of hypocrisy in modern politics, Ruth Grant writes, 
“Precisely because these [corrupted] forms of hypocrisy are unselfconscious, they are more common, 
more dangerous, and more culpable than the conscious manipulations of the cynical political con man” 
(172). Accordingly, a self-deceived Hillary Clinton appears more culpable than a lying Donald Trump. 
But how did this happen to Hillary Clinton? As David Runciman wrote of Clinton in 2008, “[Hillary 
Clinton’s] public persona is too obviously an artificial construct…But [this] means that there is less 
danger in her case than there was in her husband’s of becoming self-deceived. With Hillary Clinton there 
seems little possibility that she, any more than anyone else, will lose sight of the fact that she is a 
hypocrite” (215). So, how did she, an obvious hypocrite, appear to deceive herself about her own 
hypocrisy? Runciman is prescient here. He draws a distinction between a first and second order 
hypocrite, “between those whose hypocrisy is bounded by an understanding that hypocrisy is 
unavoidable and those whose hypocrisy has tipped over into self-deception. He claims a recurring 
problem in modern politics involves a first-order hypocrite accusing another of being a worse hypocrite 
than they, in effect saying, “’well, at least I’m not as hypocritical as you.” After which, he claims, the 
first-order hypocrite “threatens to tip over into its own kind of self-deception,” as they are left open to 
the reply, “’Well, you are if you really believe that’ (and, of course, if you don’t really believe it, then 
you’re a hypocrite too)” (200). Accordingly, Hillary’s hypocrisy appeared worse than before because she 
accused Trump of hypocrisy. By doing so she looked self-deceived regarding her own hypocrisy: were 
we supposed to believe that she did not think she too was a hypocrite? What about her past, about all 
the evidence that overwhelmingly suggests she is a hypocrite? Was she in denial about herself? In this 
way, a suspicious glance was turned in her direction and made him seem less guilty. 
While Runciman’s insight seems correct, it must be supplemented by laying bear the precise ways in 
which Trump benefited from her accusations. In some cases, for instance, Clinton’s accusations made 
her appear self-deceived about her own hypocrisy because she highlighted a failure on her part to 
address issues about which she professes to care. For example, Clinton accused Trump of using Chinese 
steel in his construction projects. The precise claim (to paraphrase): Trump talks about reviving 
American steel, putting American industry first, and being tough on China, but by using Chinese steel 
rather than American steel, it appears he does not really care about that which he claims to care, which 
is why he and his potential voters should be concerned about this. His reaction had two parts: first, he 
placed distance between him and his decision to order the steel, claiming his general contractors and 
engineers ordered the product because it was cheaper. Then, he placed the responsibility for those 
decisions on her, i.e., on years of inaction on the part of politicians. To paraphrase his reply: Yeah, I 
used Chinese steel because it was cheaper and available, just as any businessman in my position would 
because it cuts cost, but it should not be available to me or other American companies at cheaper rates, 
which means it is not my failure but a failure on the part of you and your husband, for example, to 
address this issue, and you are only now talking about it because of me. In other words, Clinton 
appeared to be a hypocrite while Trump, as a businessman, appeared to have insight into the ill effects 
of government policies for American manufacturing and be the only one talking about them. Similarly, 
Clinton accused Trump of claiming he would release his tax returns, but failing to do so, suggesting that 
his unwillingness to release his taxes was a sign he was afraid to show he made less than he claimed, 
gave less than he should, and/or did not pay anything in federal taxes (all of which are true). His reaction 
again had two parts: he placed distance between his decision not to release his taxes and his 
unwillingness to release them, claiming his lawyers advised him not to release his taxes while under 
audit, and then maintained that if he paid nothing in federal taxes (which we now know he basically did, 
paying only $750, it would make him smart because politicians, like her, would just squander the money 
anyway. His response made two implicit points that were picked up by his voters: 1) Trump knows and 
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takes advantage of all the loopholes and exemptions available to him, which any businessman would 
do; this is not his fault but a product of failed government policies to address these issues despite 
promises by politicians like Clinton to address them; 2) this makes him the perfect person to tackle 
these issues—“Nobody knows the system better than me; that is why I alone can fix it” (Jackson). We 
can clearly see how Runciman’s insight plays out in both of these cases. Clinton accused Trump of 
hypocrisy and he deflected her accusations, which made her appear self-deceived about her own 
hypocrisy. Yet, these instances also show how her accusations and his reactions reflected positively on 
Trump’s specific positionality; he appeared as one who must play by the rules and yet knows the rules 
are broken (the system is rigged), making him the perfect person to fix them. In other words, there 
appeared to be differences in policy position underlying her accusations, differences to which Clinton did 
not intend to draw attention nor want to avow. 
In many other cases, however, Trump did not seem to oppose Clinton’s policies, but what she said 
about them. In these cases, Clinton seemed to misunderstand the import of her accusations; she 
thought she was accusing Trump of hypocrisy but instead appeared to accuse him of his unwillingness 
to be hypocritical. For example, Clinton accused Trump of being a bigot regarding his pledge to prevent 
Muslims from entering the country. Racism is not something one would typically avow, so the more 
accurate accusation was (to paraphrase): your pledge makes you appear racist, which you should be 
concerned about given you claim you are not racist, or more precisely, the least racist person anybody 
has ever met. Trump dismissed this accusation, maintaining his pledge was not racist (nor xenophobic) 
but a pragmatic promise to assure the safety of US citizens; Clinton then continued to attack his pledge 
as an example of his bigotry. But the underlying issue was not necessarily whether Trump was a racist, 
but that 1) everyone knew Clinton would not accept many more Syrian refugees into the US than Trump 
and 2) yet, she did not and could not say this. That is, she made a fundamental assumption that it is 
un-American to say what he said, but not un-American to do what he said he was willing to do. While 
espousing the need for a continuation of our vetting system, even a strengthening of it, she stopped 
short of saying she would keep out the refugees, instead she claimed America should, as a matter of 
our identity, lead the world in expressing our willingness to accept the most vulnerable refugees. In 
other words, she acknowledged most Americans did not want many Syrian refugees in the country, but 
also assumed we would be embarrassed about wanting to prevent them entry, so her position was to 
save us the embarrassment of doing what the majority of Americans wanted to do by denying she would 
do it. What she appeared to be outraged about then was not what Trump planned to do, but that he 
said what he planned to do, which did not (to many) reveal he was racist but that she was a hypocrite. 
Trump was faced with a choice, to avow the hypocrisy or avow the underlying desire most Americans 
seemed to have, viz., a desire to keep out Arabs. Trump avowed the latter and seemed to millions of 
Americans more truthful—a say it like I see it type of guy—whereas Clinton looked self-deceived about 
her own hypocrisy. 
By examining these specific cases and laying bear the precise ways in which Trump benefited from 
Clinton’s accusations, we can clearly see how the liar appeared more truthful than the hypocrite in 2016: 
the hypocrite deceived herself and the liar revealed both the falsity of his claims and the truth of the 
situation. But we can also see how these cases are instances of a single mechanism—a Trumpian 
mechanism—at play in Trump’s success over Clinton. The mechanism can be outlined as follows: 1) 
Clinton accused Trump of hypocrisy with the assumption that both he and potential voters would be 
concerned to see him exposed as a hypocrite; 2) he deflected the accusations, i.e., he reacted at odds 
with the way she assumed he would act given the scope of the accusation, e.g., with indifference; and 
yet, following his reaction, 3) she continued to attack him from the standpoint she assumed he should 
have. However, it is crucial to note that this mechanism did not merely work against Clinton, but against 
Trump’s Republican primary opponents, academic critics, and most notably the mainstream media—in 
fact, many of Clinton’s accusations were merely extensions of similar accusations made by the press—
and the mechanism did not stop working in 2016 but continued to work well into his presidency. Case 
in point is Trump’s (first) impeachment.6 
The fundamental charge that led to Trump’s 2019 impeachment in the House and 2020 trial in the 
Senate was not simply that Trump engaged in a quid pro quo, a “this for that” with a foreign power, but 
that Trump’s self-interest was served at the expense of US national interest. The legal case was 
compelling; that Trump both abused his power and obstructed Congress. However, to make their case, 
the House Democrats, most notably Adam Schiff (D-CA), moved away from a strictly legal argument to 
 
6 Due to time requirements, this article does not address Trump’s second impeachment and the events following 
the election of Biden, viz., Trump’s refusal to concede, accusations of wide-spread election fraud, and the storming 
of the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. All of which will be taken up in subsequent work.  
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take a public appeal position. Rather than simply making the case that Trump pressured a foreign power 
to intervene in our elections, a violation of FEC 52 USC 30121 Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 107–155, §303(2),7 
and then obstructed Congress to hide this fact, they felt compelled to stress the critical importance that 
the quid pro quo involved Ukraine in particular. Making such a case distracted attention away from and 
effectively undermined the legal arguments by pushing Democrats to defend a position they would not 
typically avow, viz., a John Bolton view of national security. In other words, to make their legal case the 
Democrats did not need to argue why the aid to Ukraine was in our national interests, because a sitting 
president who pressures a foreign country (regardless of the country) to intervene in our election for 
his benefit is manifestly not acting in the interest of a democratic and sovereign people. Yet, the 
Democrats felt compelled to argue that Trump not only prioritized his personal interests over our national 
interests but threatened our national security by withholding aid to Ukraine. They argued this point by 
stressing how Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine was an immediate threat to US national security.8 
The mechanism was clearly at play here: 1) Democrats assumed Trump (and/or his supporters) held a 
Cold War conception of politics, i.e., they believed Trump and his allies would be concerned if he were 
exposed as a hypocrite over the threat Russia poses to our national security; 2) Trump expressed 
indifference to their accusations, claiming the call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was 
perfect, that he is extremely tough on Russia, and referring to the impeachment as a witch-hunt; 3) the 
Democrats then continued to attack him from the position they assumed he should have, a non-
hypocritical Cold-Warrior position. This is not traditionally a position Democrats would openly assert nor 
one they necessarily believe—in fact, they profess to believe in a humanitarian conception of politics, 
precisely the conception of politics that comes after the Cold War conception. Yet, this is the position 
they endorsed during the impeachment, and the impeachment prosecution became a Democratic 
argument for reviving the Cold War.9 Thus, by attempting to appear as unhypocritical Cold Warriors the 
Democrats exposed themselves as self-deceived hypocrites—or worse, dangerous self-deceived 
hypocrites, since the foreign policy position they defended could have disastrous implications for the 
US, e.g., a war with Russia. As a result, despite many Senate Republicans believing Trump to be lying 
about the alleged quid pro quo, they did not deem his behavior to rise to the level of an impeachable 
offense.10 
Identifying the mechanism at play in Trump’s relations between him and his critics is crucial for 
understanding Trump’s success. He succeeded not merely despite their continual accusations but 
because of them. But the question remains: how did Trump get the better of so many people? How, in 
other words, did the Trumpian mechanism work against his political opponents and critics? The answer, 
I think, rests upon an understanding of the mechanism as a defense mechanism. His critics did not 
actually attack Trump per se, but what object-relations theorists refer to as an inner object, i.e., a 
version of themselves they wished to disavow, a bad part of themselves that did not repress what they 
do. Essentially, they attacked an image of themselves they projected onto Trump. This last point 
deepens the import of their self-deception. It was not merely Sartrean bad-faith—that their belief of 
who they were for themselves motivated them to deny who they were for others—but such that they 
 
7 "It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or through any other person to make any contribution of money 
or other thing of value, or to promise expressly or impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection with an 
election to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select 
candidates for any political office; or for any person to solicit, accept, or receive any such contribution from a 
foreign national” (United States Code).  
8 During the final day of the prosecution’s opening arguments in the Senate trial Rep. Val Demings (D-FL) puts the 
position thusly: “[Trump] jeopardized our national security because Ukraine’s national security is our national 
security” (PBS NewsHour). 
9 As David Bromwich insightfully noticed, “the Democrats are stumbling in the dark and not finding a solid footing. 
They went to absurd lengths in hitching their opposition to Trump to the rising pressure in the policy elite for a new 
cold war; and there was something deluded in the claim, made by the lead manager of the impeachment, Adam 
Schiff, that Ukrainians ‘are fighting our fight’ against Russia” (Bromwich). 
10 As Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH) said in a statement following the vote to call witnesses in the Senate trial: “I 
believe that some of the president’s actions in this case—asking a foreign country to investigate a potential political 
opponent and the delay of aid to Ukraine—were wrong and inappropriate… [But] I do not believe the president’s 
actions rise to the level of removing a duly-elected president from office and taking him off the ballot in the middle 
of an election” (Baird). And Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN) tweeted, “There is no need for more evidence to 
conclude that the president withheld United States aid, at least in part, to pressure Ukraine to investigate the 
Bidens; the House managers have proved this with what they call a ‘mountain of overwhelming evidence’… The 
question then is not whether the United States Senate or the American people should decide what to do about what 
he did. I believe that the Constitution provides that the people should make that decision in the presidential 
election that begins in Iowa on Monday” (@SenAlexander).   
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mistakenly believed they were attacking Trump when they were actually living out (masochistically) the 
unconscious fantasy of discrediting a bad version of themselves. This unconscious self-deception enabled 
Trump, the external object, to engage in an ideology critique of what they said about what they do, and 
to avow or disavow their deeds rather than their ideology. 
Identifying this mechanism also enables us to better understand why, in early March 2020, there 
was a sudden convergence of Trump’s political opponents around the idea that Joe Biden was the anti-
Trump. In the primaries, Democrats were toying with the idea that Elisabeth Warren, Kamala Harris, or 
Pete Buttigieg would finally expose the truth about Trump on the debate stage; that one of these 
candidates would be the best person to publicly discredit and humiliate Trump (i.e., their bad self) by 
showing him to be a hypocrite rather than a liar. In effect, the bulk of the primary season was simply a 
search for the perfect candidate about whom Democrats could indulge their fantasy. The sudden 
convergence around Biden amounted to an abandonment of that fantasy. That is, in early March, 
Trump’s opponents reconciled themselves to the idea that no one was going to expose Trump for what 
he truly is and make him look bad, and that attempting to do so would only make them look worse. In 
my terminology, his opponents implicitly acknowledged the power of the Trumpian mechanism and 
thereby shed their fantasy. They obviously knew an inarticulate and gaff prone Biden would not discredit 
Trump on the debate stage. But more importantly, they also knew he would not try. In fact, although 
Biden’s campaign did not use this language, their strategy was simply to show Biden as immune to the 
Trumpian mechanism; to show he was simply a good man who would never project positions (or his 
bad self) onto Trump in an attempt to expose Trump as a hypocrite. In this way, Biden was understood 
to resist (or perhaps pre-exist)11 the operation of the mechanism, and this would benefit he and he alone 
in the general election. 
The rise of Covid-19 only made Biden’s (immunity) strategy easier as he competed in only two 
debates, made minimal public appearances, and remained at his home in Delaware the bulk of the 
campaign season. But, although his immunity to the mechanism was an essential part of his strategy, 
it was not all of it. Another important component involved Biden benefiting from the mechanism turning 
against Trump. In other words, the mechanism not only helps explain how Trump won in 2016, because 
the mechanism worked against his opponents, it also helps explain how he lost in 2020, because it was 
used against him. 
In late February, leading Democrats, such as Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi, began attacking 
Trump over his handling of the virus, e.g., not asking for more money, not distributing enough tests 
kits, appointing an immigration hawk with no experience in public health to the coronavirus task force, 
preventing the US from being better prepared for an epidemic by previously slashing CDC funding by 
16%, not having a coordinated federal response, and waiting too long to call for any funding (“too little, 
too late”). Rather than take his opponents’ criticisms at face value, that they were genuinely concerned 
about preventing the spread of a deadly disease, he assumed they were merely politicizing the virus for 
political gain. As Trump stated on February 26th, “We should all be working together. She [Pelosi] is 
trying to create panic, and there’s no reason to panic because we have done so good… She knows; all 
they’re trying to do is gain a political advantage. This isn’t about a political advantage” (Tbilisi ).12 The 
mechanism worked as follows: 1) he assumed his opponents did not ultimately care about the threat 
the virus posed to US citizens, that they were simply interested in politicizing the virus for political gain; 
2) the Democrats disavowed this position;13 and then 3) Trump began attacking them from the position 
he assumed they had. By early March, he was actively politicizing the virus, proceeding to downplay its 
devastating potential and engaging in continued attacks against his political opponents and the 
mainstream media for politicizing the virus. In other words, Trump appeared to be hypocritical by 
accusing his political opponents of politicizing the virus while transparently politicizing the virus. 
Meanwhile, Biden remained relatively silent, enabling the mechanism to work in his favor. 
So, given the fact that the mechanism was not only working against Trump, making him look 
hypocritical with respect to the virus, and that Trump was competing against an opponent seemingly 
 
11 Although Biden is roughly contemporary with the Clinton Democrats, he is a bit older and identifies himself as a 
Kennedy Democrat rather than a Clinton Democrat.  
12 He put the point more polemically on Twitter, “Low Ratings Fake News MSDNC (Comcast) & @CNN are doing 
everything possible to make the Caronavirus [sic] look as bad as possible, including panicking markets, if possible. 
Likewise their incompetent Do Nothing Democrat comrades are all talk, no action. USA in great shape! @CDCgov;” 
and “Democrats talking point is that we are doing badly. If the virus disappeared tomorrow, they would say we did 
a really poor, and even incompetent, job. Not fair, but it is what it is. So far, by the way, we have not had one 
death. Let’s keep it that way!”. 
13 Pelosi stated, “Lives are at stake… this is not the time for name-calling and playing politics” (Quinn). 
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immune to the mechanism, one would expect him to have lost in a landslide in the general election. 
This was precisely the prediction of most Democrats, e.g., Nancy Pelosi, who assured us that Trump 
and Trumpism would be thoroughly repudiated following the results of the election. However, Trump 
was not repudiated. He won over 12 million more votes than he did in 2016, ten million more than 
Clinton, receiving the second highest vote count of any candidate in US history. As such, although Biden 
won the election by seven million votes, the view that Trump would be utterly discredited because of 
his response to Covid-19 proved to be a fantasy. So, how did Trump avoid repudiation over his 
(mis)handling of the virus? Simply put, the mechanism was working in two directions; along with 
working against Trump, it was also working against his opponents. 
Following the passage of the $2.2 trillion CARES Act in late March 2020, which put $1200 directly in 
the pockets of each American citizen, the Democrats began working on a second relief package. In May, 
House Democrats passed the $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, which contained an additional $1200 in direct 
payments to citizens. Democrats knew the HEROES Act would never pass in the Republican controlled 
Senate. Instead, it was meant to serve, they claimed, as a starting point for negotiations with Senate 
Republicans and the White House over the next round of economic relief. But did the HEROES Act 
demonstrate the seriousness with which Democrats viewed the pandemic, or rather, did it demonstrate 
their hypocrisy? 
The HEROES Act was immediately blasted by both Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, who 
called it a “$3 trillion left-wing wish list,” and President Trump (McConnell). Negotiations stalled. In July, 
McConnell countered with the $1 trillion HEALS Act, which included another round of $1200 relief checks. 
Democrats refused to compromise; Pelosi tweeted, “Republicans refused to take action to feed hungry 
children nationwide,” and accused them of hypocrisy (@SpeakerPelosi). Democrats then countered with 
another version of the HEROES Act, this time a $2.2 trillion aid package. Trump issued a few press 
briefings in early August claiming he was willing to sign a relief package but that the Democrats were 
holding relief hostage because of their unwillingness to compromise on certain provisions, such as a 
high bar for state and local funding. Negotiations stalled again. Trump and Steve Mnuchin then 
countered with a $1.8 trillion proposal on Oct. 9th, again with $1200 in direct payments. Progressive 
Democrats like Ro Khanna implored Pelosi to take the deal, but Pelosi refused to budge, issuing a 
statement on Oct. 10th, “When the President talks about wanting a bigger relief package, his proposal 
appears to mean that he wants money at his discretion to grant or withhold, rather than agreeing on 
language prescribing how we honor our workers, crush the virus and put money in the pockets of 
workers” (Pelosi). When CNN host Wolf Blitzer pushed Pelosi (on air) as to why she refused to take the 
deal, she claimed “I don’t know why you’re always an apologist, and many of your colleagues, apologists 
for the Republican position.” Blitzer then asked her to look Americans in the eye and explain why she 
was refusing the deal. She claimed, “I hope you’ll ask the same question of the Republicans on why 
they don’t want to meet the needs of the American people” (Speaker Nancy Pelosi). In other words, 
Pelosi accused Trump and other Republicans of hypocrisy while simultaneously refusing to compromise 
on a stimulus package, thereby looking like a hypocrite. Why was she refusing to make a deal? Did she 
want to prevent Trump from passing a relief package prior to the election, in effect denying Trump a 
political win before Election Day? Many Americans were asking this very question. The deal struck merely 
a month after the election only gave credence to their rising suspicions. Following the election, Pelosi 
and fellow Democrats celebrated, as a great victory, the passage of a $900 billion relief package that 
only contained $600 in direct payments to citizens and lacked the bulk of state and local funding they 
deemed necessary during earlier negotiations. Matt Taibbi writes, 
 
Remember all of that state and local funding that Democrats insisted was so crucial to the aid package? Today, 
the state and local aid package signed off on by [Democrats] Manchin and Warner is down to $160 billion, 
appropriated as part of a separate bill… with the main $748 billion plan. In other words, Democrats just agreed 
to take seven times less than the $1.13 trillion they asked for in the HEROES Act, and about half of Mnuchin’s 
$300 billion offer in October that Pelosi rejected as “sadly inadequate.” As for that $748 billion Bill? According 
to the senior Democratic aide, who pointed to comments made by Mitt Romney, it includes $540 billion in 
offsets, “repurposed from March’s CARES Act.” In other words, the aide says, “The $748 billion deal is really 
just $188 billion in new money.” Given all the high-flown rhetoric the Party devoted before Election Day to 
rejecting aid packages they deemed heartlessly small, the hypocrisy, he says, is “amazing.” If you include the 
$160 billion package for state and local aid, the new deal offers a maximum of $348 billion in new money, 
well below some of the better offers they received from Republicans over the summer and fall. 
 
In other words, during the months leading up to Election Day, the Democrats appeared to many 
Americans as if they were prioritizing politics over the well-being of American citizens. Regardless of 
whether Trump took the virus seriously, he took the economy seriously, and most Americans would 
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have welcomed another round of $1200 in direct payments. In fact, many (especially in Trump’s base) 
would have been better off with such checks then they would have been had there been no pandemic 
at all. So, by refusing to compromise on a deal, Democrats appeared to be hypocritical regarding the 
virus; they seemed to care more about denying Trump a political win prior to the election, a win that 
could only increase his chances of reelection, than they did about curbing the economic impact of the 
pandemic. Therefore, since the mechanism was both working against Trump and for him (by working 
against his Democrat opponents), Trump was not discredited in the 2020 election. But, because Biden 
showed himself to be relatively immune to the mechanism, Trump lost, and Biden won the presidency. 
I do not mean to suggest, by any means, that the Trumpian mechanism explains all there is to 
Trump. It does, however, explain the depth to which Trump’s critics (and thus much of the literature on 
Trump) are blind to the Trump phenomenon. Since, for them, Trump is an inner object, they are both 
blind to the object of their rebuke and to their own role in Trump’s success. But this leaves us with the 
following question: How can we come to understand and critically engage Trump and Trumpism without 
thereby attacking a projection of our bad selves and enabling the Trumpian mechanism from working 
against us? Highlighting the importance of the mechanism can be instructive here not simply because it 
illustrates how Trump wrongfooted his opponents and how he was wrongfooted by them, but because 
it enables us to deepen our understanding of both him and his positions in regard to his opponents. For 
one, because his opponents projected particular positions onto Trump, we can better understand their 
positions, viz., the ideologies that have been hegemonic of American political discourse and the truth 
underlying these ideologies. Trump seemingly targets these ideologies, so we can then situate Trump’s 
positions in relation to them. Secondly, attending to Trump’s reactions to his opponents’ accusations 
enables us to better understand his positions. For example, rather than understand his indifference to 
particular accusations as a failing of Trump, we can understand it as a positive feature of his position. 
Thirdly, the mechanism is also useful precisely because it was turned against Trump. Why, e.g., when 
the pandemic hit the US, was Trump unable to do the thing that would have guaranteed him reelection, 
viz., declare war on the virus and politicize the fact that he was not politicizing the virus while daring 
his opponents to do so? Why didn’t he declare martial law and demonstrate the virtues of his policies? 
He was the one who claimed stronger borders made us safe, so why was he unable to demonstrate that 
by immediately shutting down travel, immigration, and commerce from other countries? In other words, 
there must be something about the social forces he represents or beliefs he holds that prevented him 
from doing this. Attending to the positions he projects onto his opponents will help us better understand 
what these are. In sum, basing an analysis of Trump and Trumpism on the specific operation of the 
mechanism enables a more forceful and accurate understanding of the Trump phenomenon, one that 
does not simply perpetuate the power of the object it wishes to critique. 
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